Direct Hit, Near Miss or Remote Miss? Why you are more confident than you should be.

_39166788_blitz416_gettyIn the years running up to the beginning of the second world war the British government was extremely concerned that in the event of hostilities breaking out, the german Luftwaffe would launch significant attacks against Britain and especially London. With an estimated 250,000 casualties in the first week alone, the consensus was that millions of Londoners would flee, leaving the industrial war engine to grind to a halt. Several psychiatric hospitals were even set up on the outskirts of London to handle the huge numbers of casualties psychologically affected by the bombing.

History tells us this was not the case, despite horrific numbers of casualties and extensive damage to homes, property and businesses throughout London.

A Canadian psychiatrist, J. T. MacCurdy, in his book The Structure of Morale postulated this was because the effect of a bomb falling on a population splits them into three groups:

1. The people killed by the bomb. As MacCurdy puts it

the morale of the community depends on the reaction of the survivors, so from that point of view, the killed do not matter. Put this way the fact is obvious, corpses do not run about spreading panic.

Harsh, but true in this model.

2. The Near Misses, the ones that

feel the blast, … see the destruction… but they survive, deeply impressed. It may result in ‘shock’…and a preoccupation with he horrors that have been witnessed.

3. The Remote Misses. These are the people who hear the sirens, the bombs explode, watch the aircraft overhead, but the bombs explode down the street. For them the experience of the bombing is that they survived easily, unlike the Near Miss group. The emotion as a result of the attack…

is a feeling of excitement with a flavor of invulnerability.

Near miss = trauma, remote miss = invulnerability.

Diaries and recollections of the period certainly support these theories. For instance, when a laborer was asked if he wanted to be evacuated to the countryside (after being bombed out of his house twice) he replied;

What, and miss all this? Not for all the tea in China!

The reason for this attitude, the sense of invulnerability, is that they have been through the very worst of time… and survived. They had faced their fears, and realized they were not as bad as they thought they were going to be, and in fact the result of surviving had given them a sense of elation that made them feel even more alive than before.

This is a very long way of saying that we may very easily view security incidents and breaches like this. Sony (perhaps) are the ones right at the centre of the blast. they are affected directly, and don’t even run around spreading panic because they are too busy dealing with the incident itself.

The near misses, Sony’s vendors, suppliers and partners are probably reeling from the near miss and are probably doing all they can to ensure it doesn’t happen to them. in short why are traumatized.

Finally, there is the rest of us. Yeah baby! Another breach, and it wasn’t us! We are invincible! We don’t need to do anything different at all, because we are survivors!

I think I see an issue here. Every time we are not breached, we become more confidant that we will not be breached, and become over confident and convinced we are having the time of our lives doing great stuff in the infosec world and not being breached. let’s hope that bomb doesn’t drop too close to home to burst that bubble, otherwise Careers is So over ceases to be a funny industry joke and very much a reality. Take the precautions now, take the threat seriously, and do what you can now, before it is too late.

I would strongly recommend reading the Book David & Goliath by Malcolm Gladwell if you would like to read more about this concept as well as others along the same lines.

A personal note…

PubGr_logoI am now under new employment as a result of an acquisition of my previous employer, and I have been fortunate enough to be elevated to Group CISO of the acquiring company. Unsurprisingly this has resulted in a massive new workload, travel schedule and responsibilities, and hence my distinct lack of posts this last few months. Despite this I have still been nominated for European Personal Security Blog 2015 in this years Blogger Awards; thank you!

Additionally, I am so proud to say that not only is my new employer keen to promote this blog internally in the new company, but also thrilled to say we have become the newest sponsor of the European Security Blogger Network.

Finally, I have been on the road a huge amount the last few weeks, including at RSA USA where I was very happy with my presentation at the RSA Studio; I spoke about how we have changed our approach to security awareness, and the use of the Restricted Intelligence product to catalyse it.

There were also talks at Munich Identity Management Conference, although the talks are not public yet.

Next week, Bsides London, InfoSec Europe, European Blogger Awards and RSA Unplugged. I am mentoring a rookie at Bsides, Speaking at infoSec, as well as at the Tripwire booth, sponsoring (and nominated!) at the Blogger Awards, and just watching at RSA Unplugged.

It’s has been a busy few months!


Three Envelopes, One CISO

three-envelopes
The outgoing CISO of a company meets his replacements for lunch the day before he starts. He hands the newcomer three envelopes, labelled 1, 2, & 3.
I have one piece of advice for you. Whenever you have a breach, open each envelope in turn.
The job continues as expected over the months, when the fateful day come and the company suffers a security breach. Just before he is called into the boardroom to represent himself, he remember the envelopes and opens the first one. Inside, the card reads:
Blame your predecessor.
This he does and moves on.
A few months later another security breach occurs. Standing outside the boardroom, he opens the second envelope”
Blame your team.
A few months later, a third breach occurs. With a smile on his a face and spring in his step he approaches the boardroom confident he is going to get away with it again. As he is called in, he opens the envelope, mentally preparing to talk his way out of trouble. His eyes widen as he reads the card:
Prepare three envelopes.

 

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Last week saw the rather shocking news of the Sony security breach that suffered a very overt attack on Sony and multiple days of downtime. Rumours abound around if it was an insider job, the extent of the damage, the rebuilding of the entire Sony Active Directory structure and wiping of all workstations and reinstallation of operating systems. The exact details will no doubt take many months to surface, but one thing seems to be clear; the blame of the breach is being squarely laid at the CISO’s (and sometimes the CIO’s) feet.
One article from IT Security Guru supported this with a quote from Phil Lieberman, CEO of Lieberman Software:
This was a perfect example of sloppy IT security and a CISO that did not implement proper privileged identity management, or a disaster recovery backup plan for continuity of business. The consequences were a loss of control over his environment caused by a focus on convenience of IT rather than the security of the enterprise.

This may well be true of course, and the Sony CISO may well have been incompetent in this instance. There is however a very real alternative possibility. What if the CISO had been very clear in the dangers in this case of convenience over security? And what if the board, or other senior leadership simply felt it was too “expensive” culturally and from the perspective of impact to the current productivity of the company. Sony is a strongly creative focussed business; it is not a bank, an energy company or in a regulated environment, so they are not forced to carry out particular security activities. The ability of their employees to not work as flexibly and without restriction could well be seen as a higher risk than that of a breach (even after the 2011 breaches).

Perhaps the cost of this breach will simply be a blip in the years to come.

The key thing though is that the business may well have accepted this risk and simply moved on, much as they would have accepted a financial risk and moved on. Sometimes financial risks results in massive downturns in business, and I don’t always see the CFO being pilloried on the first day without evidence – that is normally reserved for the CEO or Chair of the Board.

We seem to want to chop down the CISO as soon as something goes wrong, rather than seeing it in the context of the business overall.

Let’s wait and see what actually happened before declaring his Career Is So Over, and also appreciate that security breaches are not always the result of poor information security, but often simply a risk taken by the business that didn’t pay off.

I’m off now to get my PS4 in a fire sale.


“Compromise” is not a dirty word

compromise

If it wasn’t for the users we could secure the company much more easily.

or

They just don’t get it, we are doing this for their benefit.

We often hear statements like this being made, and sometimes even uttered by ourselves. In fact I daresay they are often made by people in very different support industries, not just information security, but it seems that we harbour these feelings more than most.

Effective security is security that is understood, adhered to and respected. Ineffective security is either too lax, or so tight that individuals do their level best to work around it. They are not working around it because they are subversive elements in our organizations, but rather because it is restricting them from getting their day jobs done; it has become a barrier.

Each organization will have it’s own unique requirements, and even within that organization unique requirements will come about. The finance and legal teams are likely to require a different level or type of security around their work than a creative or IT team. If you have ever observed a creative team in full flow you will understand that the concept of a “clear desk” policy is not only laughable but also extremely restrictive to the very fundamentals of their craft. That same policy however will be more easily understood and accepted by the aforementioned finance and legal teams.

So in this example do you enforce an organisation wide clear desk policy? Probably not. It may make sense to have a departmental one, although in some circumstances this would be harder to police. Or you could implement clear desk “zones”, i.e. areas where it is not necessary to have a clear desk because of other measures. The measure may be soft, such as background checks on cleaning staff or hard, such as supervised cleaning staff.

Variations to blanket policies always cost money, but if you ascertain the potential financial value of that loss and compare it to the cost of the measures you can help your business to understand, adhere and respect the measure you are proposing.

This doesn’t just apply to physical security (although it very frequently does!) but also to technical and administrative controls too. Policies have to be very carefully written and reviewed by the various stakeholder of your organisation to ensure the right balance is struck. Technical controls also have to have this balance. Data Loss protection (DLP) is a marvelous technology that when implemented correctly can reap huge rewards and avoided risks, but it is expensive and time consuming to install and run. Who should ultimately make that decision, you, or the business. (clue, it’s not you).

Don’t be afraid to compromise in your dealings with your organisation. If they disagree with your approach, they either get it and feel it is simply the cost of doing business, in which case go off and look at other ways to support them. Or they don’t get it, which means you need to do a better job of convincing them of the risk in which case, go off and look at other ways of making your point. A good compromise is made when each party respects and aligns to the other parties point of view, not when each party is on fundamentally different sides.

Help your business respect and align to the information security ideals you hold dear, and do the same for theirs and you will always get more effective security.


Risk, Rubble and Investment

rubbleOriginally written and posted October 13th 2014 on the InfoSecurity 2014 Blog (and reiterating a pet core message of mine  again!).

Risk is a bad thing. Therefore risk needs to be reduced to rubble, or even better to dust and then swept away under the carpet never to be seen again.

This is the attitude that many of us have, and then pass onto our senior leadership when it comes to information security programs. “Invest £10 million and we will buy technology that will make us safe” we have often said in the past. “My blinky boxes will soon find your risks and reduce them to nothing!”. It should be no surprise for so many of our industry therefore that CISO stands for “Career Is So Over”.

What we often fail to appreciate is that the senior leadership and boards of virtually all organizations understand risk far better than us. They deal with financial, legal, HR and international risk on a regular basis, and know how to take advantage of it to their benefit. Their advisors in the various fields know how to communicate their unit risks in a way that makes sense to business, be it financial, reputational or whatever else makes sense in their industry. The leadership do not require specialist knowledge of these areas because the risk is being translated into terms they understand.

The information security industry however still often talks in terms of “APT’s”, “DLP”, “TLS” and other obscure TLA’s* while trying to explain why more money is needed to “secure all the things”. What is the benefit to the business? What is the real risk in terms everyone can understand? Translating these technical issues and risks into business risks has always been a challenge and has often resulted in information security being perceived as the “expensive part of IT” asking for more money with little positive influence to the business.

If you work in a brewery, the ultimate goal of everyone who works there should be to sell more beer. If you work for Oxfam, the ultimate goal is to get aid to those that need it as quickly, effectively and efficiently as possible. If you work in a publicly listed company, the ultimate goal is to make more money for the shareholders. The role of information security within any organization is not exempt from this; security doesn’t get a special pass because it is, well, security. The role of the information security function is to support the ultimate goal of the organization it operates in.

Understand what your ultimate goal is. Focus your strategy on ensuring you are helping meet that goal. Be willing to compromise in certain areas of security if it helps meet that goal. Ensure you senior leadership understand the risks (in their language, not yours) involved in those compromises. if you don’t get what you want then move onto the next piece of work that supports your ultimate goals (or be prepared to fight harder and more lucidly for your original cause).

If it was that easy you wouldn’t be reading this, but surely it is easier than the ongoing battle for investment that we ultimately never win anyway?

*Three Letter Acronyms (surely you know that?)


Computing SecurityNote: Many of you know I was up for the “Personal Contribution to IT Security” Award at the recent Computing Security Awards. I was (un)fortunately Runner Up in this category, but thank you again to all of you who not only may have voted for me but also nominated me in the first place. It was a wonderful evening with good friends from my work and InfoSec life, and a good excuse to dress up in my best party frock. Here’s to next year!

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Not All Risks Are Bad (even the bad ones…)

Keep_Calm_Big_ThinkThe very term ‘risk” often makes people feel uncomfortable, with connotations of bad things happening and that if risk is not minimized or removed then life (or business) becomes too dangerous to continue.

Crossing the road is risky, especially if you live in a busy city, and yet people, young and old alike, do it every day. In fact it is riskier than flying  and yet I would argue that there are more people afraid of flying that of crossing the road. Hugh Thompson of RSA put it very well in his 2011 RSA Conference Europe presentation when he raised the issue of “Sharkmageddon”; more people are killed every year sitting on the beach by falling coconuts than those by sharks, but there is an almost universal fear of sharks. We irrationally consider swimming in the sea safer (less risky?) than sitting under a coconut tree.

Risk is an inherent part of our lives, and if we let the realities of risk take control of our business decisions we become the corporate version of an agoraphobic; staying in the safe confines of the environment  we know and not ever venturing out to be active in the outside world; ultimately we wither and fail be it as individuals or as a business.
In my experience, one of the most misunderstood approaches to treating a risk is to accept or manage it. Most people are comfortable with mitigating, transferring or avoiding a risk as they involve some kind of act to deal with them, something we are all familiar with. We fix a problem, give the problem to someone else or stop doing the thing that causes us the problem in the first place. However, it often feels wrong to simply accept a risk, in essence to do nothing. Although this is not strictly the case, it is essentially how we feel we are dealing with it. You are accepting that there is either nothing you can do, or nothing you are willing to do to reduce the risk. However, you are not blindly accepting it at face value; rather you are being cognisant of the risk as you continue your operational activities. You know it is there as you carry on your day job. These activities and the very environment you are operating in can change without notice, and make the decision to accept a risk now the wrong course of action.

For instance, it may now be cheaper to fix the risk than it was going to cost you, or the highly lucrative contract that made the risk acceptable is now over and there is a greater risk of financial lost that costs more than the revenue you are bringing in. The reasons for change are often financial, although not always. Your risk appetite may also have reduced or the industry you are operating in becomes more regulated; all of these example mean your decision to accept needs to be reviewed.

All risk decisions need to be reviewed regularly, for exactly the reasons given above, but in my opinion it is risk acceptance decisions that should be reviewed more often, as they are the ones that are made as a result of more transient and changing factors, and are the ones that will potentially harm the organisation the greatest.

tiger__extIt’s a bit like keeping a tiger as a pet – it looks awesome and maybe even draws admiring glances from many, but if you forget you locked it into your bathroom overnight you are going to have a very big surprise when you get up to go to the toilet in the middle of the night. You can’t accept risks without truly understanding them in the first place.